PhishPin / Brands Live Phishing Data / Government & public services / myGov (Australia / India)
myGov (Australia / India) phishing: how to spot fake sites, domains & scams
PhishPin's phishing-feed index currently lists 128 hostnames that reference myGov (Australia / India), across 252 reported URLs from 3 of 6 threat feeds we track. myGov (Australia / India) ranks #121 of 2108 brands we track by reported hosts. In the last 15 days, 1 newly registered domains contained or closely resembled the name.
Government & public services · rank #121 of 2108 by reported hosts
Key findings for myGov (Australia / India)
- Impersonation pressure is Elevated (41/100): myGov (Australia / India) has more reported hosts than 94% of the 2108 brands we track.
- That is 12× the average for government & public services (10 hosts per brand).
- 2% of the hosts (2) are listed by two or more independent feeds, so most of this is not single-source noise.
- 77 hosts (60%) hide the myGov (Australia / India) name in a subdomain of an unrelated site, the trick that makes a link look official at a glance.
- The most common ending is .com (62 hosts, 48%).
- 48% of hosts pair the brand with a bait word. The most common is “login” (14 hosts).
- 1 lookalike domains were registered in the last 15 days.
How attackers fake myGov (Australia / India)
These breakdowns cover all 128 matching hostnames, not only the rows listed below.
Top endings (TLDs)
Bait words next to the brand
Hostname tricks
Hosts reported in phishing feeds
The most widely reported hostnames that reference myGov (Australia / India), ranked by how many feeds list them and then by reported URLs. Search, filter and export all 100 rows.
| # | Hostname (defanged) | Pattern | Feeds | URLs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | mygov-aus[.]firebaseapp[.]com | subdomain trick | 2 feeds | 2 |
| 2 | mygov-aus[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 2 feeds | 2 |
| 3 | web3-mygov[.]duckdns[.]org | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 9 |
| 4 | my-gov-au[.]duckdns[.]org | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 8 |
| 5 | claim-refund-mygov[.]au[.]upharma[.]pt | subdomain trickclaim | 1 feed | 6 |
| 6 | login-my-gov[.]com | login | 1 feed | 6 |
| 7 | mygov-blue-cricket-dabbahalazon438928[.]codeanyapp[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 6 |
| 8 | mygov[.]pedantic-heisenberg[.]109-71-253-24[.]plesk[.]page | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 6 |
| 9 | www[.]mygov-security[.]com | security | 1 feed | 6 |
| 10 | mygov-2au[.]top | name in domain | 1 feed | 5 |
| 11 | mygov-security[.]com | security | 1 feed | 5 |
| 12 | mygov-webservice[.]com | service | 1 feed | 5 |
| 13 | mygov[.]vic-wa[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 5 |
| 14 | www[.]mygov-account-login[.]com | account | 1 feed | 5 |
| 15 | www[.]mygov-atologin[.]com | login | 1 feed | 5 |
| 16 | mail[.]mygov[.]one | name in domain | 1 feed | 4 |
| 17 | my-govcheck[.]myftp[.]org | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 4 |
| 18 | mygov-access-government-services-support[.]codeanyapp[.]com | subdomain trickaccess | 1 feed | 4 |
| 19 | mygov-au[.]gandhfinancial[.]com[.]au | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 4 |
| 20 | mygov-au1[.]top | name in domain | 1 feed | 4 |
| 21 | mygov-australia[.]s4-tastewp[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 4 |
| 22 | mygov-info-aus[.]cleverapps[.]io | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 4 |
| 23 | mygov-refunds[.]com | refund | 1 feed | 4 |
| 24 | mygov-tax-refund[.]codeanyapp[.]com | subdomain trickrefund | 1 feed | 4 |
| 25 | www[.]mygov-inboxaus[.]com | name in domain | 1 feed | 4 |
| 26 | www[.]mygov-ref[.]info | name in domain | 1 feed | 4 |
| 27 | mygov-inboxaus[.]com | name in domain | 1 feed | 3 |
| 28 | mygov-login[.]hmc[.]edu[.]au | subdomain tricklogin | 1 feed | 3 |
| 29 | mygov-refund-tax-australia[.]codeanyapp[.]com | subdomain trickrefund | 1 feed | 3 |
| 30 | mygov[.]one | name in domain | 1 feed | 3 |
| 31 | mygov[.]re | name in domain | 1 feed | 3 |
| 32 | mygov[.]sec03ure[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 3 |
| 33 | www[.]mygov-login[.]hmc[.]edu[.]au | subdomain tricklogin | 1 feed | 3 |
| 34 | www[.]mygov-user[.]20-245-45-137[.]plesk[.]page | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 3 |
| 35 | login[.]mygov-au[.]xyz | login | 1 feed | 2 |
| 36 | my-gov-device-login-report[.]com | login | 1 feed | 2 |
| 37 | mygov-account[.]com | account | 1 feed | 2 |
| 38 | mygov-auth-secure54[.]netlify[.]app | subdomain trickauth | 1 feed | 2 |
| 39 | mygov-b264a8[.]ingress-florina[.]ewp[.]live | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 2 |
| 40 | mygov-id[.]publicvm[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 2 |
| 41 | mygov-online[.]publicvm[.]com | subdomain trickonline | 1 feed | 2 |
| 42 | mygov-user[.]20-245-45-137[.]plesk[.]page | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 2 |
| 43 | mygov[.]services-on[.]icu | subdomain trickservice | 1 feed | 2 |
| 44 | commonwealthbank[.]au-mygov[.]info | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 45 | energy[.]mygov[.]au[.]nsw-ql[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 46 | evrsign-mygov[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 47 | evsigns-mygov[.]firebaseapp[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 48 | evsigns-mygov[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 49 | gr-mygov[.]firebaseapp[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 50 | gr-mygov[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 51 | inboxmedi-mygov[.]com | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 52 | isgn-mygov[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 53 | login-mygov[.]cfd | login | 1 feed | 1 |
| 54 | login[.]mygov[.]mybazar[.]tk | subdomain tricklogin | 1 feed | 1 |
| 55 | login[.]mygov[.]mygov[.]idrawpro[.]com | subdomain tricklogin | 1 feed | 1 |
| 56 | loginhelp-mygov[.]com | login | 1 feed | 1 |
| 57 | my-gov-claim910[.]pages[.]dev | subdomain trickclaim | 1 feed | 1 |
| 58 | my-gov-inf[.]top | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 59 | my-gov-security-update[.]com | security | 1 feed | 1 |
| 60 | my-gov[.]au-notify[.]org[.]tba-mimarlik[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 61 | my-gov[.]sbs | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 62 | my-govid-com-au-notice-support-update-verify[.]builderallwppro[.]com | subdomain tricksupport | 1 feed | 1 |
| 63 | my-govl-d-update-account-information-verify[.]builderallwppro[.]com | subdomain trickupdate | 1 feed | 1 |
| 64 | my-govld-update-info-verify[.]builderallwppro[.]com | subdomain trickupdate | 1 feed | 1 |
| 65 | mygov-4-997cef[.]ingress-daribow[.]ewp[.]live | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 66 | mygov-4-afb03d[.]ingress-baronn[.]ewp[.]live | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 67 | mygov-5-997cef[.]ingress-bonde[.]ewp[.]live | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 68 | mygov-997cef[.]ingress-erytho[.]ewp[.]live | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 69 | mygov-afb03d[.]ingress-bonde[.]ewp[.]live | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 70 | mygov-apply[.]pages[.]dev | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 71 | mygov-au[.]bltty[.]info | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 72 | mygov-audoc[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 73 | mygov-aus[.]publicvm[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 74 | mygov-aut[.]firebaseapp[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 75 | mygov-aut[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 76 | mygov-ld-verify-information-details-home[.]builderallwppro[.]com | subdomain trickverify | 1 feed | 1 |
| 77 | mygov-mediplus[.]com | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 78 | mygov-message-gov[.]org | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 79 | mygov-onlineportal[.]org | online | 1 feed | 1 |
| 80 | mygov-rebates-id[.]publicvm[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 81 | mygov-refund-id[.]publicvm[.]com | subdomain trickrefund | 1 feed | 1 |
| 82 | mygov-refund[.]com | refund | 1 feed | 1 |
| 83 | mygov-refund[.]netlify[.]app | subdomain trickrefund | 1 feed | 1 |
| 84 | mygov-refundbill[.]web[.]app | subdomain trickrefund | 1 feed | 1 |
| 85 | mygov-secure-login[.]netlify[.]app | subdomain tricksecure | 1 feed | 1 |
| 86 | mygov-servicealert[.]com | service | 1 feed | 1 |
| 87 | mygov-support[.]pages[.]dev | subdomain tricksupport | 1 feed | 1 |
| 88 | mygov-taxreturn1[.]com | name in domain | 1 feed | 1 |
| 89 | mygov-web-ato[.]firebaseapp[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 90 | mygov-web-ato[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 91 | mygov[.]atoclaim[.]org | subdomain trickclaim | 1 feed | 1 |
| 92 | mygov[.]aus-online[.]icu | subdomain trickonline | 1 feed | 1 |
| 93 | mygov[.]idrawpro[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 94 | mygov[.]online-servic[.]icu | subdomain trickonline | 1 feed | 1 |
| 95 | mygov[.]onlinesservice[.]icu | subdomain trickonline | 1 feed | 1 |
| 96 | mygov[.]publicvm[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 97 | mygov[.]supportxit[.]com | subdomain tricksupport | 1 feed | 1 |
| 98 | mygov[.]trustedonor[.]com | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 99 | nsvi-mygov[.]web[.]app | subdomain trick | 1 feed | 1 |
| 100 | onlineservices-mygov[.]life | online | 1 feed | 1 |
Is your brand in these feeds?
Free check: email-spoofing gaps, registered lookalikes and feed listings for your own domain. About a minute, public DNS only.
New lookalike domains registered recently
Domains registered in the last 15 days that contain myGov (Australia / India)'s name, sit one character away from it or use look-alike characters. Attackers often register these days before sending the first email.
Registrations per day
Top endings of new lookalikes
| # | Domain (defanged) | Why it matched | Registered |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | mygov[.]lol | contains brand name | 23 Oct 2026 · 15 days ago |
How myGov (Australia / India) phishing works
Phishing against myGov (Australia / India) follows patterns common to government & public services. Typical lures:
- A "refund", "overdue balance" or "unclaimed benefit" message with a link to a fake portal.
- A toll or fine notice by text with a short link and a tight payment deadline.
- A call or message from a "case officer" threatening arrest or deportation unless you pay.
- A request to "verify your identity" for benefits, student aid or a travel programme.
Red flags
- Government agencies do not demand payment by gift card, crypto or text link.
- Official sites end in .gov; lookalikes use .com, .xyz, .top or words like "refund" and "pay".
- The first contact is a text or an unsolicited call rather than a letter or your own online account.
Real myGov (Australia / India) domains
If the address in your browser is not one of these (or a subdomain of them), it is not myGov (Australia / India). The list is not exhaustive.
my.gov.aumygov.inIf you already clicked or entered details
Do not pay. If you shared your SSN or ID, place a fraud alert or credit freeze, and report it at reportfraud.ftc.gov and identitytheft.gov. Reach the agency through its official .gov website.
Protecting a brand like myGov (Australia / India) from lookalike domains
If you run security, brand or fraud for a company that is copied this way, this is the order that works in practice:
- Enforce DMARC. Move your policy to quarantine, then reject, so attackers cannot send mail that passes as your domain.
- Watch new registrations. Lookalikes appear daily; the earlier you see one, the sooner you can act, ideally before the first email goes out.
- Register the obvious typos and keyword variants you can afford to hold, and check which lookalikes are already registered by someone else.
- Report fast. A live fake needs a request to the registrar and host, plus a report to browser safe-browsing lists and the public feeds shown above.
- Tell your customers where you will and will not ask for logins, codes or payments.
Protect your brand from lookalike domains
myGov (Australia / India) is one of 2108 brands in this index, but attackers copy any company whose customers log in or pay. PhishPin checks your domain for registered lookalikes, email-spoofing gaps and listings in these same phishing feeds, then helps you get the fakes taken down.
Audits use public data only – we never touch your servers. Results within 24 hours.
Questions about myGov (Australia / India) phishing
How can I tell if a message from myGov (Australia / India) is phishing?
Check the sender and link domain first. Government agencies do not demand payment by gift card, crypto or text link. Official sites end in .gov; lookalikes use .com, .xyz, .top or words like "refund" and "pay". The first contact is a text or an unsolicited call rather than a letter or your own online account. When in doubt, do not use the link: type my.gov.au into your browser or open the official app.
How many myGov (Australia / India) phishing sites has PhishPin found?
As of 7 Nov 2026, 128 hostnames referencing myGov (Australia / India) appear in the phishing feeds PhishPin indexes (252 reported URLs); 2 of them are listed by two or more feeds. These are reported hostnames, not a count of sites that are online today; many are removed quickly and some matches are coincidental.
What do fake myGov (Australia / India) domains look like?
In our data, the most common ending for reported hosts is .com. The brand is most often combined with the word "login". 77 hosts put the brand name in a subdomain of an unrelated site. Always read the part of the address just before the first single slash: that is the real site. Real myGov (Australia / India) addresses end in my.gov.au.
What should I do if I entered my details on a fake myGov (Australia / India) page?
Do not pay. If you shared your SSN or ID, place a fraud alert or credit freeze, and report it at reportfraud.ftc.gov and identitytheft.gov. Reach the agency through its official .gov website.
How do I report a fake myGov (Australia / India) website or message?
Forward phishing emails to reportphishing@apwg.org, report scams at reportfraud.ftc.gov, and report the page to Google Safe Browsing. Also tell myGov (Australia / India) through the contact options on its official website (my.gov.au).
Is it safe to visit the domains listed on this page?
No. They are shown defanged, with dots in brackets, so they cannot be clicked by accident. Do not type them into a browser. Listings are warnings from automated matching, and some are harmless coincidences. Treat everything listed as potentially phishing, infected or malware, and have a certified security expert review any list before you block, import or act on it. PhishPin is not responsible for loss or damage from using this data.
How does PhishPin find lookalike domains of myGov (Australia / India)?
We read the daily list of newly registered domains (1,050,000 domains over the last 15 days) and flag those that contain the brand name, differ by one character or swap look-alike characters. A match is a warning sign, not proof of abuse.
How can a company protect its own brand from lookalike domains like these?
Publish an enforced DMARC policy so nobody can send mail as your domain, monitor newly registered domains that resemble your name, register the obvious typo domains, and file takedown requests with the registrar, host and browser safe-browsing lists when a fake goes live. PhishPin's free brand audit checks the first three for your domain.
Other government & public services being impersonated
All government & public services brands ranked